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A MODEL OF IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND CULTURAL 







  I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and cultural 
transmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matched 
to play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-random 
due to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers to a 
tendency of individuals to have a higher rate of interaction with individuals of 
their type than with similar numbers of other agents. I derive a cultural 
transmission mechanism in order to examine the influence of viscosity and of 
other institutional characteristics of society on the evolutionary selection of pro-
social norms. The main findings are that strict norms, sustained by strong 
internal punishment, need either viscosity or strong institutional pressures to 
persist, while norms of intermediate strength persist under a variety of 
institutional characteristics. Endogenizing norm strength allows to identify two 
scenarios in which pro-social norms survive: One of rigidity in which 
separation (high viscosity) leads to monomorphic equilibria with strict norms 
for cooperation. And one of integration (low viscosity) where intermediate 
norms persist in polymorphic equilibria. Furthermore, with endogenous norms, 
viscosity and cooperation are not linked in a monotone way.  
 
JEL classification: C70, C73, Z13. 1 Introduction
In the last decades Europe has experienced a marked rise in immigration and
migration policy is one of the most ﬁercely debated issues in many european
countries. Economists have been quick to analyze some of the consequences of
migration on the host countries’ economies. Topics studied include the eﬀect
of migration on wages, employment or the welfare state.1 One issue, though,
that has been mostly neglected is the impact of immigration on culture or more
precisely on social norms prevailing in a society, in spite of the fact that this is
one of the most widely discussed topics in european societies nowadays.2 Maybe
people worry just as much about the erosion of social norms and cultural values
as a consequence of migration as they do worry about wages and jobs. The
extent to which migration impacts culture and social norms is clearly linked to
the issue of integration. On the one hand, social norms might be more easily
transmitted and cultural clashes avoided if there is a high level of integration of
immigrants. On the other hand, isolation can help to protect groups adhering
to pro-social norms.3
This study is an attempt to provide some insights into these and other
important issues within an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. I consider
a set-up where agents are matched to play a one-shot interaction prisoner’s
dilemma in a society where there is a social norm for cooperation. And I address
the following more general questions:
- Can pro-social norms survive immigration of agents that do not adhere to
this norm ?
- How does the answer to the previous question depend on the institutions
of a society and in particular on the degree of integration ?
F r o mt h es t a n d a r dp e r s p e c t i v eo fadirect evolutionary approach the ﬁrst
question has a clear-cut answer: If evolutionary selective forces apply directly to
strategies, if the population dynamics is payoﬀ monotonic, and if matching takes
places randomly within the whole population, cooperation is never evolutionary
stable.4
The idea of integration appears in a somewhat diﬀerent disguise in contribu-
tions to the biological literature - termed population viscosity there - and relates
to matching probabilities.5 In fact a population is called viscous if agents have
an increased probability of interacting with agents of their own type. Viscosity
is maybe the most narrow measure of the degree of integration of a society. The
1See Borjas (1999) for a survey on this literature.
2Most of the research on the relation between migration and culture is empirical and
asks the reverse question. How does culture determine migration and trade ? There are
few theoretical contributions related to this topic. One example is K´ onya (2002, 2001) who
presents macroeconomic models of cultural assimilation. An interesting empirical study of
assimilation is DeLeire et al. (2004).
3Pro-social norms are norms that induce agents to act in a way conferring beneﬁts to others
at a cost to themselves. A norm for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma is a well-known
example. Used in this sense the concept of pro-sociality can be seen as more or less equivalent
to the concept of altruism in evolutionary biology.
4Weibull (1995), Vega-Redondo (1996).
5The concept of population viscosity is due to Hamilton (1964). See also Price (1970).
3second question is answered in this literature as follows: Cooperative behaviour
can only survive if the society displays a high enough degree of viscosity. The
intuition is clear: Cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma promotes the ﬁtness
of defectors at the expense of the cooperators themselves. If cooperation is
to survive as a trait it has to be that the beneﬁts of this altruistic behaviour
fall disproportionately onto other cooperators. This is the case whenever the
population is suﬃciently viscous.6
In contrast to direct evolution the indirect evolutionary approach has se-
lection work on preferences instead of strategies. An (internalized) social norm
for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma aﬀects an agent’s preferences in the
sense that deviations from the norm cause him to suﬀer feelings of guilt, shame,
embarrasment or anxiety. Consequently norm-adherence in these approaches
will be determined by the (material) ﬁtness implications of the strategies in-
duced by the norm. Bester and G¨ uth (1998) or also Guttman (2003) study such
mechanisms.
Cultural evolutionary models try to go beyond the pure ﬁtness implications of
preferences and (induced) strategies and consider explicitly the process of trans-
mission of traits through either the family (vertical transmission), peer-groups
(horizontal transmission) or socializing institutions of society (oblique trans-
mission).7 Gintis (2003) presents a model with exogenous vertical and oblique
transmission and an (also exogenous) ﬁtness-disadvantage for agents that have
a preference for altruism. His main ﬁnding is that in order for the altruistic
preference to survive the level of oblique transmission has to be suﬃciently
high. Henrich and Boyd (2001) consider a model in which norms are transmit-
ted through social learning. In their model pro-social norms are stable because
the horizontal transmission process stabilizes punishment of non-adherers.
The rational socialization approach to preference formation assumes that
altruistic and forward-looking parents deliberately pass on preferences to their
children trying to maximize what they, as parents, see to be the children’s
future well-being. Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) present a model of endogenous
vertical transmission in which altruistic preferences survive, because minorities
have higher incentives to socialize their oﬀspring to their own preferences than
majorities do. 8
In contrast to the previous literature that focuses on individual preference
traits, in this study I concentrate on social norms taking into account the role
of society for the evolution of preferences. In many cases it is (internalized) so-
cial norms that shape preferences by determining what are socially and morally
acceptable behaviours.9 On the other hand what constitutes a social norm is to
a large extent determined by what are common behaviours in a society. I derive
6Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000), Hamilton (1964), Bowles and Gintis (1997), Axelrod, Ham-
mond and Grafen (2004).
7Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Henrich and Boyd (2001), Henrich and Boyd (1998)
Henrich and Gil-White (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005), Richerson, Boyd and Henrich
(2003), Henrich (2003).
8See also Guttman (2001a, 2001b).
9Azar (2001), Cialdini et al (1990), Grasmick and Green (1980), Liu (2003), Reno et al.
(1993), Young (1998).
4a cultural evolutionary model to analyze the interplay between economic incen-
tives, the formation of social norms, the evolutionary selection of preferences
and rational behaviour of agents given these preferences.
While cultural evolution in my model puts selection pressures on preferences
it does not deny that holding their preferences ﬁxed agents act rationally. In
this aspect my model relates very much to the indirect evolutionary approach.
It diﬀers from this approach in conceiving the evolution of preferences as an
essentially social and cultural phenomenon, placing a focus explicitly on social
norms. This is the ﬁrst contribution of the paper.
The second main contribution of this paper is to introduce the important
question of population viscosity as a special institutional characteristic into the
study of norm-transmission and the evolution of pro-social behaviour. Vis-
cosity has been little studied in Economics and there are almost no formal
models. An exception are Myerson, Pollock and Swinkels (1991) who extend
Nash-equilibrium to viscous populations. Related studies in evolutionary biol-
ogy are Henrich (2003), Boyd and Richerson (2002) or Mitteldorf and Wilson
(2000) among others. I add to these studies by rigorously introducing popu-
lation viscosity into a model of cultural evolution. Viscosity in my approach
has two kinds of eﬀects: Short-run eﬀects by changing the incentives of ratio-
nal players and long-run eﬀects by aﬀecting norm strength and the evolution of
preferences.
Finally my paper is also related to studies of norm-guided behaviour in
other ﬁelds of Economics. Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) use a model
with endogenous social norms to examine the interaction of monetary incentives
and social norms in the welfare state. In Benabou and Tirole (2005) norms with
endogenous strength are part of a theory of pro-social behaviour. Unlike the
analysis in my paper their models are essentially static. To my knowledge my
study is unique in examining the consequence of endogenous social norms for
t h ee v o l u t i o n a r ys e l e c t i o no fp r e f e r e n c et r a i t s . 10
For exogenous norms the main results of the paper are: If norms are very
strict, in the sense that they induce strong feelings of guilt if violated, a high
level of viscosity or other forms of institutional pressures are needed to have
cooperation survive. Norms of intermediate strength on the contrary can survive
under a variety of institutional settings.
Endogenizing social norms delivers the following results: Pro-social norms
persist in two polar scenarios: One of rigidity in which separation (high vis-
cosity) leads to monomorphic equilibria with strict norms for cooperation (sus-
tained by high levels of internal punishment). Cooperation in this scenario is
achieved through rigid population structures (viscosity) which in turn lead to
strict norms. In this sense rigidity is self-reinforcing. The second scenario is one
of an integrated society with intermediate norms sustained by lower internal
punishment and displaying heterogeneity of types in equilibrium. Here integra-
tion stabilizes a polymorphic equilibrium with norms that are less strict. Thus
10Obviously my study also ties in with other studies of norm-guided behaviour in Economics
such as Azar (2001), Elster (1989), Guttman (2001a), Nyborg and Rege (2003), Traxler (2005),
Young (1998) among many others
5in contrast to standard direct and indirect evolutionary approaches, my mecha-
nism based on endogenous social norms always produces polymorphic equilibria
in fully integrated societies (where matching is random).
Furthermore I show that - contrary to what is often taken for granted in the
literature - viscosity and cooperation are not linked in a monotone way. Pro-
sociality that is sustained through culturally transmitted social norms diﬀers
from genetically transmitted pro-sociality in this important aspect.
The exogenous institutional characteristics I consider - while having a quite
straightforward and monotonic impact on behaviour whenever preferences are
ﬁxed - turn out to have interesting non-monotonic eﬀects when one allows for
changing social norms and the evolution preferences. The diﬀering implications
diﬀerent institutional designs have together with the relatively fast speed of
cultural (as opposed to biological) evolution make the results an issue for policy
design. At the end of the paper I shortly discuss the welfare implications of
diﬀerent institutional designs.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the model is described. In sec-
tion 3 I study the equilibria of the basic model (with exogenous norm-strength)
and in section 4 norm-strength is endogenized as described above. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Social Norm
Consider a society consisting of a (unit-mass) continuum of individuals I.I n d i -
viduals are randomly and repeatedly matched in pairs to interact in Prisoner’s
dilemma type of situations.11
In the bilateral game each player has two actions available: X and Y . The
action set Z = {X,Y } is the same for all players i ∈ I. Payoﬀsf r o mt h e
(symmetric) Prisoner’s dilemma interaction can be summarized by the following





where 1 >a>d>0. It is well known that in this game Y is a dominant strategy
for both players and consequently the unique equilibrium prediction leads to a
payoﬀ of d for both players.
Assume now that there is a social norm for cooperation (”for playing X in the
Prisoner’s dilemma”) in the society. Individuals have internalized this norm and
deviating from it thus causes them feelings of guilt, shame or embarrasment.12
11As explained in the introduction matching will not always be perfectly random. The exact
matching technology is speciﬁed in section 2.2.
12In principle social norms can also be sustained by external mechanisms such as social
disapproval. This is distinct from the internal, ”self-imposed” sanctions I consider here. See
6This psychological cost w is reﬂected in the following payoﬀ matrix Aw ∈ R2×2.
X Y
X a 0
Y 1 − w d − w
(2)
I will distinguish between three diﬀerent strengths of the norm. In particular
I will call the social norm weak if w<min{1−a,d}, i.e. if violation of the norm
causes feelings of guilt so weak that they are always outweighed by the material
payoﬀ-advantage of defecting (playing Y ). In this case the two game forms
(1) and (2) represent the same strategic context, namely that of a Prisoner’s
dilemma. I will call the norm intermediate in the following two cases: If w ∈
[1−a,d] (2) represents a stag-hunt game, having two symmetric Nash-equilibria
in pure strategies where both agents play the same strategy (either X or Y ).
If w ∈ [d,1 − a] then (2) represents a chicken game, with two asymmetric
Nash-equilibria in pure strategies where one players X and the other player
Y . The unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium in this case is in mixed strategies
where each player plays w−d
1−a−dX ⊕ 1−a−w
1−a−d Y. Finally I will call a norm strict
if w>max{1 − a,d} , i.e. if the internal punishment caused by a norm-
violation is so strong that cooperation is a dominant strategy for an agent
having internalized this norm.13
Suppose now that there is migration of agents from a diﬀerent cultural back-
ground, who adhere to diﬀerent social norms. In particular let us assume that
they do not have internalized the social norm w, so their payoﬀsi nt h eP r i s -
oner´s dilemma are given by matrix (1).14 Then there are two diﬀerent types in
the economy. To model strategic interaction between these two types of agents
we describe the following population game:
2.2 The Population Game
Let the type space be T = {0,w} with typical element τ,where a w-type’s payoﬀs
are given by matrix Aw as deﬁn e di n( 2 )a n da0 - t y p e ‘ sp a y o ﬀsb ym a t r i xA
as deﬁned in (1). Agents have incomplete information about each other’s type.
When choosing an action zi ∈ Z in the bilateral game they estimate the type
of their match from the distribution of types in the economy and from their
knowledge about the matching technology described below.
The set of population states (or distributions of types) is P = {p : p ∈ [0,1]}
where p denotes the share of w-types in the population. Obviously then the
Elster (1989) or Gintis (2003) for a discussion. An alternative modeling approach would be
to assume that the psychological payoﬀ-loss w depends on the opponent’s action. In this case
the analysis becomes slightly more complicated but results do not change qualitatively.
13I assume that agents in choosing their strategy rationally trade oﬀ material beneﬁts and
psychological incentives. Empirical support for this assumption can be found in Bosman and
van Winden ((2001), (2002)). Theoretical papers employing the same or similar social norms
are Benabou and Tirole (2005) or Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) among others.
14There is evidence of huge diﬀerences in the domains of cooperative behaviour among dif-
ferent cultural groups, that are independent of diﬀerences in environment or local regularities.
(Henrich and Boyd 1998)
7share of 0-types is 1 − p. A complete description of the population is given by




∈ R2×1 denotes the
distribution of actions among τ-types.15 στ
X being the share of τ-types that
use action X. Obviously στ
z ∈ [0,1]∀z ∈ Z,∀τ ∈ T and στ
X + στ
Y =1 ∀τ ∈ T
have to hold. σ =( σ0,σw) is the collection of these measures or the distribution
of actions in the population. Furthermore distributions of actions where στ
z ∈
{0,1}∀z ∈ Z,∀τ ∈ T, i.e. where all agents of the same type choose the same
action are denoted (z0,z w)w h e r ez0 indicates the action chosen by all 0-types
and zw the action chosen by all w−types.16
Matching takes place randomly in a viscous population. The latter meaning
that individuals have a tendency to interact more often with individuals that
are of the same type than agents of another type do. I measure the degree of
integration of a society with the paramter x ∈ [0,1], where x =1m e a n st h a t
the society is fully integrated and x = 0 means that the society is fully viscous,
implying that types interact with probability 1 among themselves and never
with agents of another type.
For any ﬁx e dd i s t r i b u t i o no ft y p e sp a n dd e g r e eo fv i s c o s i t yx material payoﬀs




∈ R2×1 is the vector ﬁeld that for a w-
type associates expected material payoﬀs (corresponding to each of the possible
actions zi ∈ Z) to every distribution of actions in the population σ =( σ0,σw).


































1 − (1 − p)x
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(4)
As a consequence of population viscosity a w-type is matched with proba-
bility (1 − p)x with a 0-type and with probability 1 − (1 − p)x with another
w-type. While a 0-type is matched with probability px with a w-type and with











could thus be called the matching
vectors of a w-type and a 0-type respectively. They are known to all agents at
all times.
15Here 0 indicates the transpose of the vector/matrix in question.
16Note that z =( z0,z w) can be seen as formally equivalent to a pure strategy in the
(bilateral) Bayesian game where z0 denotes the action a player chooses conditional on being
a 0-type and zw the action a player chooses conditional on being a w-type.
8If the society is fully viscous (i.e. if x = 0) the matching vectors are given
by (0,1)0 for a w-type and by (1,0)0 for a 0-type. In this case (3) and (4)
reduce to Πτ(σ)=Aστ ∀τ ∈ T. As in fully viscous societies both types interact
exclusively among each other material payoﬀs for any agent depend neither on
the distribution of types in the population p nor on the distribution of actions
among agents of a distinct type.
If the society is fully integrated (if x = 1) matching is random and the
matching vector given by (1 − p,p)0 for both types. In this case (3) and (4)
reduce to Πτ(σ)=( 1−p)Aσ0+pAσw ∀τ ∈ T. With random matching material
incentives are thus the same for both types.
Note that bilinearity of Πτ(σ) implies that expected (material) payoﬀso fa
τ-type i when using the ”mixed action” (σiX ⊕ (1 − σi)Y )a r eg i v e nb y
Πτ(σi,σ)=σiΠτ(X,σ)+( 1− σi)Πτ(Y,σ)( 5 )
Individuals are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers and
for any ﬁxed distribution of types p utility (or total payoﬀ)i sg i v e nb y
z(σ)=( πw(·),π0(·))
where πw(σ)=( πw(X,σ),πw(Y,σ))0 is the expected utility of a w-type for
each of his actions when he faces a distribution of actions in the population of
σ. Utility relates to material payoﬀsa sf o l l o w s :F o ra0 - t y p ew h e r et h e r ea r e
no psychological payoﬀs obviously Π0(σ)=( Π0(X,σ),Π0(Y,σ))0 = π0(σ). By
contrast a w-type suﬀers a utility-loss everytime he plays Y and πw is obtained
from (4) by replacing A with Aw. The utility functions extend to mixed actions
in an analogous way as given by (5).
Having speciﬁed payoﬀs we have a complete description of the population
game Γ =( I,T,Z,P,z(·)). To describe optimal behaviour I rely on the concept
of Nash-equilibrium:17
Deﬁnition 1 A Nash-equilibrium of the population game Γ is any population
proﬁle (σ,p) s.th. στ
z > 0 ⇒ z ∈ argmaxZ πτ(z,σ)∀τ ∈ T.
We are interested in how rational behaviour in this population game aﬀects
the dynamics of norm-adherence and the evolutionary selection of preferences.
To answer these questions we have to specify the process of cultural transmission
of social norms:
2.3 The cultural transmission process
Social norms are adopted via 2 mechanisms: First they are transmitted hori-
zontally via peer interaction. There is a huge amount of evidence that humans
aquire much of their behaviour through social learning. However both theory
17Again there is a formal equivalence between the Nash-equilibria of Γ and the symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibria of the bilateral game with incomplete information.
9and empirical research indicate that humans do not simply copy other individ-
uals at random, but they seem to rely on rules that make copying of succesful
agents more likely.18 Success is identiﬁed here with material payoﬀs as described
by Π0 and Πw. Norm transmission is typically seen to be biased in this sense
because individuals with higher material payoﬀs are likely to enjoy higher sta-
tus in society. This makes the norms they adhere to more appealing and gives
them a higher cultural impact.19 I will refer to this process as (payoﬀ-biased)
horizontal transmission.
Secondly the adoption of the pro-social norm is enhanced because institu-
tions of society promote this norm. By structuring interactions institutions lead
to framing and other situation construal eﬀects that favor the spread of some
social norms.20 Also legal norms or public policies can induce social norms by
stigmatizing some behaviours while promoting others.21 The pro-social norm
can be (more or less) explicitly transmitted through socialization institutions
such as schools, universities or churches. And ﬁnally communication media can
shift reference points and in this way aﬀect norm-transmission. In my analy-
sis one particular institutional characteristic - namely the degree of integration
- is highlighted. I will subsume all other eﬀects under the term institutional
transmission.22
18Henrich and Boyd (2001,1998), Henrich and Gil-White (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005).
19The relevant payoﬀs here are material payoﬀs. While this seems clearly the right approach
in a biological context with genetic evolution, it is maybe not as natural in a set-up where
evolution of preferences is a cultural phenomenon. Nevertheless psychological/emotional pay-
oﬀs should not aﬀect an agents aptitude as a cultural model for the following reasons: There
is evidence suggesting that a) material wealth and happiness are separated by individuals
(Bosman and van Winden (2001),(2002)) and b) that we are more likely to adopt the pref-
erences of agents who are materially rich rather than of those individuals who are ”happy”
(Huck (1998)).
20Many experimental studies show that ideals and norms are not absolute but inﬂuenced
by the institutional structure in which an agent is placed. (Hoﬀmann et al. (1994) Schotter,
Weiss and Zapater (1996)). Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2005) use data from separated and
reuniﬁed Germany to test whether there exists a feedback eﬀect from the economic regime on
individual preferences. They ﬁnd strong and signiﬁcant evidence of the impact of institutions
on preferences. See also Bowles (1998), Huck (1998) or Gintis (2003).
21Hirschmann (1984) recognized this fact when he remarked that raising the cost of anti-
social behaviour might not be the appropriate policy measure whenever it is mainly values
instead of tastes that drive behaviour. In this case he suggested that legal measures (such as
prohibition) are more eﬀective as they can shift norms.
22R e l a t e dt ot h i si st h ep r o c e s so fo b l i q u et r a n smission as considered by for example Gintis
(2003), Gintis (2002). In this paper I am interested in the formation and transmission of social
norms rather than in socialization through intergenerational (vertical or oblique) transmission
of exogenous preference traits.
10The cultural transmission process is illustrated in Figure 1.









Figure 1: The Cultural Transmission Process
Horizontal transmission is modelled as follows: Suppose that at some point
in time t an individual of type 0 meets an individual of type w with prob-
ability ptx and observes that individual’s type and average material payoﬀ
Πw
t (σw,σ)= :Πw
t in that period.23 With complementary probability a 0-type
meets another 0-type. And analogously with probability (1 − pt)x a w-type
meets a 0-type observing her type and average payoﬀ a n dw i t hc o m p l e m e n t a r y
probability someone of her own type.
Denote the type of an individual’s cultural model by m ∈ {0,w}. After such
a random encounter individuals might adapt the norm of their model. More
speciﬁcally if an agent’s cultural model is of his own type he will stick to his
norm with probability 1. If the cultural model is of another type he might
adapt her norm with a probability that depends linearly on (positive) payoﬀ-
diﬀerences. The probability that an individual of type 0 adapts the w-norm at





t)1+ if m = w
0i f m =0 (6)
α ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that measures the importance of payoﬀ for (hor-
izontal) norm-transmission. 1+ is the indicator function taking the value 1 if
the preceding term is positive and 0 otherwise. Note that as Πw
t −Π0
t ∈ [−1,1)





t )1+ if m =0
0i f m = w (7)
Independently of the parameter α this rule is neutral in the sense that if both
t y p e sg e tt h es a m ep a y o ﬀ in expectation their population shares stay unchanged.
23In the following I will omit the argument of the payoﬀ function when it can be done
without ambiguity and denote average material payoﬀso faw - t y p ea tt i m et by Πw
t and
average material payoﬀso fa0 - t y p eb yΠ0
t.
11A high value of α implies that the norm transmission process is quite inert in
the absence of payoﬀ-diﬀerences. Social Learning in this case is highly adaptive.
On the other hand if α is small the norm is transmitted with high probability
even if the cultural model has lower or equal payoﬀ. In this case agents can be
seen as displaying a high degree of conformity in the sense that they easily (and
without particular reason) adopt the norm of their model.24
The total share of w-types in the population after horizontal transmission
can be computed easily using (6) and (7) as:
Pr(w)t = pt(1 − Pr(0|w)t)+( 1− pt)Pr(w|0)t (8)




Pr(0)t =1− Pr(w)t (9)
denotes the total share of 0-types after horizontal transmission.
Let us now consider the impact of institutions: Under the inﬂuence of in-
stitutional pressures some of the 0-types from equation (9) will switch to the
w-norm. I assume that institutional transmission is proportional to the ”eﬀec-
tive” number of w-types in the society, i.e. to the number of w-types a 0-type
perceives in his environment ptx. Having the parameter ∆ ∈ [0,1] measuring the
strength of institutional pressures the share of 0-types that adapt the w-norm
because of institutional transmission is given by ptx∆. While it is clear that
institutional transmission cannot be independent of the eﬀective number of w-
types, the assumption of exact proportionality is maybe the most conservative
in an attempt to keep the number of parameters in the model to a limit.25
Adding institutional transmission to horizontal transmission we get the fol-
lowing population dynamics:
pt+1 =P r ( w)t + ptx∆(1 − Pr(w)t)
= pt + pt(1 − pt)x[α(Πw
t − Π0
t)(1 − ptx∆)+∆]
or in continuous time
·
p = p(1 − p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − px∆)+∆]= :f(p) (10)
24It is important though to note that this is distinct from conformist transmission, as
usually used in the literature. Conformist transmission refers to a tendency to copy the most
frequent behaviour in a population. There is quite some evidence though - both theoretical
and empirical - that apart from payoﬀ-biases people display a tendency to copy frequent
behaviour. (Henrich and Boyd (2001), Boyd and Richerson (2005)). See also Ellison and
Fudenberg (1993) or Bernheim (1994). I will give a short discussion of conformist biases in
Appendix 0.
25One could argue that immigrants create their own institutions promoting diﬀerent norms.
Letting ∆w denote the strenght of established institutions and ∆0 the strenght of new insti-
tutions (promoting the 0-norm) with ∆w > ∆0 the state equation is as follows:
·
p = p(1 − p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − px(∆w − ∆0) − x∆0)+( ∆w − ∆0)]
It can be seen that focusing on (∆w − ∆0) and normalizing ∆0 = 0 does not impact the
behaviour of this dynamics qualitatively. The basic assumption is that ∆w > ∆0.
12Note that if ∆ = 0 this equals the familiar Replicator Dynamics (up to a
change of time scale).
3 Cultural Equilibrium
I call a cultural equilibrium in this model a situation where - given equilibrium
play in the population game - the share of norm-adherers in the population
remains constant. Or more precisely:




Typically though we will be interested in cultural equilibria that are locally
stable in the sense that the state trajectory can be kept arbitrarily close to the
equilibrium state given that the initial state is suﬃciently close.26
The set of locally stable cultural equilibria obviously depends on the strength
of the norm. I will describe the diﬀerent cases in turn.27
3.1 Weak Norm
If the norm is weak, defection is a dominant strategy in the bilateral game for
both the w- and the 0-types. In this case the population dynamics is trivial: As
payoﬀs for both types are the same horizontal transmission is neutral and the
dynamics is governed by institutional transmission only. Full adherence to the
w-norm (p = 1) is globally stable whenever (∆,x) >> 0. Note though that with
weak norms norm-adherence leads to behaviour that is ”phenotypically” indis-
tinguishable from behaviour without the norm. Any population equilibrium will
be characterized by full defection. The more interesting cases are consequently
those in which the norm is of a strength to induce (at least sometimes) a diﬀer-
ent behaviour of the two types. These are the cases of intermediate and strict
norms.
3.2 Strict Norm
If the norm is strict, cooperation is a dominant strategy for the w-type. Conse-
quently all the Nash-equilibria of the population game are of the form (Y,X,p)
i.e. population proﬁles where all 0-types play Y and all w-types play X. The
26Or more formally I will call p∗ locally stable if ∀R>0,∃r>0,s.th.p(t0) ∈ Br ⇒ p(t) ∈
BR,∀t ≥ t0, where BR is an open ball around p∗ with radius R, BR : kpk <R .In fact most
of the equilibria I will call locally stable below satisfy a stronger criterium of asymptotic local
stability, i.e. they are not only stable in the above sense but also local attractors of the system.
27I will use the terms population equilibrium and cultural (population) equilibrium inter-
changeably to denote an equilibrium state p∗ of equation (10) . Strategy proﬁles that consti-
tute Nash-equilibria for any given population state p will be called (Nash-) equilibria of the
population game.
13cultural equilibria in this case are both monomorphic states as well as the poly-
morphic states p1 and p2.28 Which of these will be locally stable depends on
the vector of institutional characteristics (∆,x). It is clear that very high in-
stitutional pressures ∆ always lead to the spread of the w-norm. Let us then
focus ﬁrst on the more interesting case where ∆ is arbitrarily small (but strictly
positive). Integration impacts the set of stable cultural equilibria as follows:
If the degree of integration is very small (if 0 <x<min{a−d
1−d, 1 − d
a})t h e
monomorphic equilibrium p = 1 is globally stable. The reason is that for low
x both types mainly interact among each other. As a consequence w-types will
get the high payoﬀ for joint cooperation relatively often while 0-types will often
get the lower payoﬀ associated with mutual defection. This biases the social
learning process in favor of the w-norm.
If integration takes on intermediate values two mutually exclusive cases
arise depending on the payoﬀ parameters. Cooperation survives in both: If
x ∈ (a−d
1−d,1 − d
a) (implying that a + d<1, i.e. that the material gains from
unilateral defection are higher then the losses from unilateral cooperation in the
Prisoner´s dilemma), the globally stable equilibrium is the polymorphic state
p1. The reason is that for low levels of norm-adherence p 0-types will obtain
lower material payoﬀs in expectation, what biases social learning in favor of the
w-norm and has p rise. As p rises this payoﬀ bias shrinks and reverts at p1. If
on the other hand x ∈ (1 − d
a,a−d
1−d)( i m p l y i n gt h a ta + d>1) this reasoning
goes the other way round. The polymorphic equilibrium will be unstable and
both monomorphic states will be locally stable with their basins of attraction
separated by the interior equilibrium p2.
Finally if the degree of integration is very high ( x>max{1 − d
a, a−d
1−d})0 -
types will be able to beneﬁt from the cooperative behaviour of the w-types and
thus obtain a higher material payoﬀ.P a y o ﬀ-biased social learning then always
works against the w-norm.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If w>max{1 − a,d}, ∆ > 0 arbitrarily small and
(i) if 0 <x<min{a−d
1−d, 1 − d
a} the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1 .
(ii) if x ∈ (a−d
1−d,1 − d
a) the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = p1.
(iii)if x ∈ (1 − d
a,a−d
1−d) the locally stable equilibria are p∗ = {0,1}.
(iv) if x>max{1 − d
a, a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =0 .
Proof. see Appendix A
The intuition for this result is clear: The strict social norm leads to strong
internal sanctions for norm-violations. This induces norm-adherers to uncondi-
tionally cooperate in the Prisoner’s dilemma thereby promoting the success of
0-types at the expense of the norm-adherers themselves. The strict norm sur-
vives as a preference trait if and only if the beneﬁts of the altruistic behaviour
it induces fall disproportionately onto other norm-adherers. This is the case
28The expressions for p1 and p2 are rather complicated and stated in Appendix A.
14whenever the population is suﬃciently viscous. The more integrated (less vis-
cous) societies are the more institutional pressures are needed to sustain strict
norms.
This point is made precise in the following corollaries: There are two critcial
levels of institutional pressures that can ensure the persistence of the pro-social
norm. These treshhold levels are given by ∆1 =:
[x(1−d)−(a−d)]α
1−x[(a−d)−x(1−d)]α and ∆2 :=
α[xa − (a − d)] for the two mutually exclusive paramter constellations where
a + d ≶ 1. Note that both treshholds are strictly increasing with α and vanish
if α =0 . The reason is simply that for α = 0 social learning displays no payoﬀ-
bias. But if material payoﬀs are irrelevant for the evolutionary selection of
preferences any arbitrarily small level of institutional transmission will induce
global convergence to p =1 . Note also that both treshholds rise with x. The
intuition simply is that for strict norms more integration biases social learning
against the pro-social norm. Consequently institutional pressures need to be
higher to sustain it. Consider ﬁrst the case where a + d<1. This is the case
where material gains of unilateral defection are higher than the opportunity
costs of unilateral cooperation.
Corollary 1a If a+d<1 the monomorphic equilibrium state p∗ =1is globally
stable iﬀ ∆ > ∆1.If ∆ ∈ [∆2,∆1] cooperation survives in the polymorphic
equilibrium p = p1.
Proof. Appendix A
In the second case where a + d>1w eh a v e :
Corollary 1b If a+d>1 the monomorphic equilibrium state p∗ =1is globally
stable iﬀ ∆ > ∆2. If ∆ ∈ [∆1,∆2] the monomorphism p =1is still locally
stable.
Proof. Appendix A
Figure 2 displays the state equation as a function of p and x for varying
strengths of institutional pressures. 29 If ∆ is small, as in Figure 2a, it is mainly
the degree of integration of the society that acts as a selecting force to determine
the set of locally stable equilibria of the system. It can be seen that for small x
only p∗ = 1 is locally stable, for intermediate x the globally stable equilibrium is
polymorphic and for high levels of xp ∗ = 0 is globally stable. In Figure 2b the
forces of institutional pressures outweigh the forces of integration, so p∗ =1i s
globally stable, but for high x c o n v e r g e n c ei ss l o wb e c a u s eo ft h ew e i g h to ft h e
induced payoﬀ-bias against the strict norm. In Figure 2c institutional pressures
dominate all other forces. Consequently p∗ = 1 is selected, convergence being
faster for higher levels of integration.
29The parameters used for the graphs are: a =1 /2,d=1 /4, and α =1 /2.
15We can sum up the ﬁndings of this subsection as follows:
Summary Strict norms for cooperation do either need separation (high popu-
lation viscosity) or suﬃciently strong institutional pressures to persist in





































































Figure 2c: ∆ =0 .35
16As it should be clear by now that higher institutional pressures always en-
hance the evolutionary selection of the w-norm, I will focus in the following
sections on the special, but most interesting case where ∆ is arbitrarily small
but strictly positive.
3.3 Intermediate Norm
If the norm is intermediate in strength, two mutually exclusive cases can arise
depending on the payoﬀ-parameters.
3.3.1 a + d>1:Prisoners and Stag-Hunters
In this case the norm is intermediate whenever w ∈ [1 − a,d]. The payoﬀ matrix
Aw then describes a stag-hunt game. Remember that this (bilateral) game has
two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies in which either both players cooperate or
both free-ride. To see what are the Nash equilibria of the population game ﬁrst
note that Y is still a dominant strategy for a 0-type. Clearly then the proﬁles
where all players defect ((Y,Y,p)) are Nash-equilibria ∀p ∈ [0,1]. The proﬁles
(Y,X,p)w h e r ew - t y p e sp l a yX (and 0-types Y ) will be equilibria if and only if
the share of w-types in the population is suﬃciently high. This can be seen by
noting that it will be optimal for a w-type to choose X in such an equilibrium
iﬀ
πw(X,z∗) ≥ πw(Y,z∗) (11)
where z∗ =( z∗
0,z∗
w)=( Y,X). This is equivalent to
p ≥
(1 − w − a) − x(1 − d − a)
x(a + d − 1)
=: e p (12)
We can state the following result:
Proposition 2 If w ∈ [1 − a,d] the Nash-equilibria of the population game Γ
are given by (Y,Y,p)∀p ∈ [0,1] and (Y,X,p)∀p ∈ [e p,1].
Obviously for p ≥ e p an issue of equilibrium selection arises. I will assume
that in this case the equilibrium (Y,X,p) is selected. This choice is rationalized
by noting that the equilibrium in which w-types cooperate pareto-dominates
the equilibrium in which there is full defection.30
Note that x<a+w−1
a+d−1 implies e p<0 what in turn implies that given our
assumption on equilibrium selection a w-type will cooperate unconditionally for
all population shares p. But then the analysis for this range of x corresponds
to the case with the strict norm discussed above.
Focus on the case where x ≥ a+w−1
a+d−1 . Then there exists a non-empty range
of population shares [0, e p) in which w-types will ﬁnd it optimal to free-ride,
30Assuming that players coordinate on the ineﬃcient equilibrium would also be plausible.
But then the parameter region is indistinguishable from that of the weak norm and the implied
dynamics is rather trivial. Tha ti sw h yIf o c u so nt h i sc a s e .
17in this way depriving the 0-types of their payoﬀ advantage from unilateral de-
fection. Consequently if p<e p both types will earn the same material payoﬀ
in expectation and the dynamics of norm-adherence will be governed exclu-
sively by institutional transmission. This leads to a steady growth in norm-
adherence until the share of w-types reaches e p. Obviously p =0i sa l w a y su n -
stable in this region. One can further subdivide this region into two subregions:
If x ∈ (a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d] the globally stable equilibrium is p = 1 as w-types earn on
average higher material payoﬀs than 0-types under this parameter constellation.
This fact biases social learning in favor of the w-norm. Whereas for very high
x ( x>max{a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d})t h ep a y o ﬀ-bias works against the w-norm rendering
p = 1 unstable and thus p = e p globally stable.
As can be seen in the next proposition long-run cooperation is enhanced
compared to the case of strict norms.
Proposition 3 If w ∈ [1 − a,d] , ∆ > 0 arbitrarily small and:
(i) if 0 <x<min{a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1 .
(ii) if x ∈ (a−d
1−d, a+w−1
a+d−1 ) the locally stable equilibria are p∗ = {0,1}.
(iii) if x ∈ [a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d] the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1 .
(ii) if x>max{a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = e p.
Proof. Appendix A
Under the conditions of this proposition and if the degree of integration
is suﬃciently high (x>a+w−1
a+d−1 ) every stable equilibrium involves cooperation
(even if (∆,x) → (0,1)). This is in stark contrast with the case of the strict
norm. With strict norms as (∆,x) → (0,1) the set of locally stable equilibria
reduces to p∗ = 0 . Norms of intermediate strength though will always survive
in fully integrated societies (where x = 1). The reason for this diﬀerence lies
in the fact that for an intermediate strength of the norm, norm-adherers are
conditional cooperators, cooperating only if the share of norm-adherers p is high
enough. Consequently they cannot be as easily exploited by non-cooperators.
Note that the behaviour of an agent adhering to the intermediate norm in
these equilibria cannot be distinguished from the behaviour of an agent adhering
to the strict norm. ”Phenotypically” thus the equilibrium p = 1 is identical for
both strict norms and intermediate norms (with a+d>1). Finally observe that
as the degree of integration rises e p also rises implying that there will be more
cooperation in any stable polymorphic cultural equilibrium for higher degrees
of integration.
Next turn to the case where a + d<1
3.3.2 a + d<1:Prisoners and Chickens
The intermediate norm corresponding to this case is w ∈ [d,1 − a]. The game
form Aw then represents a chicken game. This (bilateral) game has two asym-
metric Nash-equilibria in pure strategies in which one player plays X and one
player Y . This has as a consequence that in a population with ”many” w-types,
there is no Nash-equilibrium where all w-types choose the same action z.I na n y
18population equilibrium in this region a w-type will randomize. If on the other
hand the share of 0-types is suﬃciently high, a w-type will ﬁnd it optimal to
play X. (As in this case he is matched with high probability with a 0-type who
has as a dominant strategy to play Y ). This case occurs whenever
πw(X,z∗) ≥ πw(Y,z∗) (13)
where z∗ =( Y,X)o re q u i v a l e n t l yi ﬀ
p ≤
(1 − w − a) − x(1 − d − a)
x(a + d − 1)
= e p
We can state the following result:
Proposition 4 If w ∈ [d,1 − a] the Nash-equilibria of the population game Γ
are given by: (Y,X,p)∀p ∈ [0, e p] and (Y,(σw∗
X ,(1 − σw∗





Now w-types cooperate (play X) if there is a low level of norm-adherence
and randomize if p is high. Again for high degrees of viscosity (x<min{1 −
d
a, 1−d−w
1−d ) full norm-adherence to the w-norm (p = 1) is globally stable as in
this case norm-adherers will be mainly matched with other norm-adherers. For
intermediate degrees of integration a+d<1 (meaning that the gain of unilateral
defection is higher than the (opportunity) cost of unilateral cooperation) implies
that if w-types are matched mainly with each other and if p ≥ e p s.th. they
use the mixed action σ∗
w =( σw∗
X ,(1 − σw∗
X )) they will obtain a higher payoﬀ
on average than 0-types mainly matched with each other. As the degree of
integration rises this material payoﬀ advantage will diminish and ﬁnally reverse
in favor of the 0-types. For p<e p w-types will cooperate and obtain lower
material payoﬀs than 0-types whenever integration is high. Consequently for
very high degrees of integration ( x>max{1−d−w
1−d ,1 − d
a}) p = 0 is globally
stable. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If w ∈ [d,1 − a] ,∆ > 0 arbitrarily small and
(i) if 0 <x<min{1 − d
a, 1−d−w
1−d } the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1 .
(ii) if x ∈ [1 − d
a, 1−d−w
1−d ) the locally stable equilibria are p∗ = {0,1}.
(iii) if x ∈ [1−d−w
1−d ,1 − d
a] the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = p1.
(iv) if x>max{1−d−w
1−d ,1 − d
a} the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =0 .
Proof. Appendix A
Now the pro-social norm does not survive as a preference trait in fully inte-
grated societies (as (∆,x) → (0,1)), even though norm-adherers are conditional
cooperators. The reason lies in the fact that now w-types ﬁnd it optimal to
cooperate whenever they are few. This maybe somewhat paradoxical result
comes from the incentives the payoﬀs in the chicken game provide. Let us com-
pare these incentives to those in the stag hunt game: In the stag-hunt game
19establishing joint cooperation is diﬃcult because of ”fear”. A w-type fears that
whenever he plays X he could be matched with someone playing Y a n di nt h i s
way be exploited. On the contrary in the chicken game the problem is ”greed”
rather than ”fear”: A w-type matched with someone who cooperates wants to
play Y because unilateral defection is still proﬁtable in spite of the existence
of the pro-social norm. This incentive structure has as a consequence that in
t h es t a gh u n tg a m eh i g h e rs h a r e so fn o r m - a d h e r e n c ee n h a n c ec o o p e r a t i o nb y
w-types, because a high share of norm-adherers can reduce the fear of being
exploited by making this more unlikely. In the chicken game context it is a high
population share of 0-types that enhances cooperation by w-types because the
probability of the match defecting is high. But this renders p = 1 unstable in
integrated societies while making p =0ag l o b a la t t r a c t o r .
Summing up the results from this section we have:
Summary If norms for cooperation are of intermediate strength they can sur-
vive the cultural evolutionary process in both scenarios: high viscosity and
high integration. High institutional pressures are necessary for the persis-
tence of the pro-social norm in integrated societies under some parameter
constellations but not under others.
4 Endogenous Norm-strength
4.1 Equilibria
The baseline case of exogenous norms illustrates that norm-strength matters
when it comes to determining the equilibrium share of norm-adherers. Typically
though norm strength will not be exogenous. Rather it will depend on the
informational environment such as for example the distribution of preferences
in an agent’s sample. In this section I endogenize norm-strength by linking it
to the share of norm-adherers in society.
In particular I will assume that the strength of internal punishment rises
with the number of norm-adherers in the sample of a particular w-type.31 ”I t ’ s
not right what I’m doing, but as everybody else does so, it’s ok.” is a revealing
phrase that often accompanies norm-guided behaviour. Well-known examples
where the mere fact that a behaviour is common reduces the strength of internal
sanctions include not going to vote, minor tax evasion, welfare dependency, not
going to church, divorce or free-riding on public transport.32
31It should be clear that the relevant number here is the number (or share) of norm-adherers
in a particular w-types sample and not the number of norm-adherers in the society. For
example the internal sanctions someone suﬀe r sb e c a u s eh ed i dn o tg ot ov o t em i g h tb eq u i t e
low if noone else he knows went to vote - independently of whether overall participation in
the election was high or low.
32Empirical support for such norms can be found in studies of norm-guided behaviour in
economics (Azar (2001), Nyborg and Rege (2003)), in the law-literature (Grasmick and Green
(1982), Liu (2003)) or in social psychology (Cialdini et al. (1990), Reno et al. (1993)). For
models employing similar norms in a diﬀerent contexts see Benabou and Tirole (2005), Traxler
(2005) and Lindbeck,Nyberg and Weibull (1999). For a general discussion see Elster (1989).
20To formalize this idea denote the proportion of w-types in a w-type’s sample
by
s := [1 − (1 − p)x]
and let the strength of the norm be given by some function
w(s):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
s.th. w(1) = 1, w(0) = 0,w (s) ∈ C2 and
∂w(s)
∂s > 0. The sign of the derivative
expresses the fact that more norm-adherence tends to make a norm stronger.
The cultural equilibrium determines thus norm-strength which in turn deter-
mines the equilibrium. This sort of feedback-eﬀects between equilibrium and
social norm are a characteristic pattern for norm-guided behaviour. In fact as
Benabou and Tirole (2005) emphasize it is sometimes the very fact that ”it is
just not done” that makes a given behaviour socially or morally unacceptable.
In this way norm-adherence determines the strength of the norm. On the other
hand the strength of a social norm aﬀects peoples’ preferences, actions and the
likelihood that the norm is internalized. In this way the strength of the social
norm determines the cultural equilibrium. Focusing on only one of the two
aspects - equilibrium or norm - misses an important part of the picture.









It can be seen that population viscosity enhances norm strength( ∂s
∂x < 0).
Higher population viscosity implies that norm-adherers mainly interact among
each other, so in each norm-adherer’s sample the share of norm-adherers will be
very high and consequently the norm very strict.
This fact will strongly impact our previous results, as it breaks the monotone
relationship between viscosity and cooperation. Consider ﬁrst the case where
the payoﬀ matrix (1) is such that a + d > 1 :
If the degree of integration is low norm- adherers almost exclusively interact
with other norm-adherers. This implies that the share of norm-adherers in any
w-type’s sample is high, the social norm strict and thus (as we know from Section
3.2) only sustainable through very high degrees of viscosity. In this sense rigidity
is self-reinforcing: Rigidity (viscosity) leads to strict norms which in turn need
even more rigidity (either viscosity or strong institutional pressures) to persist.
Whenever 0 <x<min{1− d
a,
a+w(e s)−1
a+d−1 }33 the society is suﬃciently viscous
to sustain strict norms, as the beneﬁts of pro-social behaviour fall disproportion-
ately on norm-adherers. In this parameter range the globally stable equilibrium
is p∗ =1 .
Slightly higher degrees of integration will still lead to strict norms, but vis-
cosity will not be high enough to ensure a material payoﬀ-advantage to norm-
adherers. Consequently the social norm will not be selected by the evolutionary
33e s denotes the solution to the following ﬁxed point equation:
(1−w(s)−a)−x(1−d−a)
x(a+d−1) = p.
21dynamics. As the degree of integration further rises norm strength will fall.
Finally high degrees of integration will lead to intermediate norms sustained in
polymorphic equilibria.
Note that if x → 1 both monomorphic equilibria are unstable: The reason
is that if p → 1 the norm will be strict and thus not sustainable with high
integration. On the other hand if p → 0 the norm becomes weak driving the
dynamics away from p =0 . Fully integrated societies thus sustain a globally
stable polymorphic equilibrium with intermediate norm strength.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If a + d>1,∆ → 0 and
(i) 0 <x<min{1 − d
a,
a+w(e s)−1
a+d−1 } the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1
















a+d−1 } the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = e p
Proof. Appendix B
There are two scenarios in which cooperation survives in a globally stable
equilibrium: In very viscous society sustained by strict norms and correspond-
ing high levels of internal punishment and in very integrated societies sustained
by intermediate norms and correspondingly lower levels of internal punishment.
Note that only the latter equilibria are polymorphic. Maybe somewhat counter-
intuitively, integrated societies thus sustain heterogeneity while viscous societies
imply monomorphic equilibria. Also note that the share of norm-adherers for
any polymorphic equilibrium is maximized at x =1 .
With endogenous norm strengths the relation between viscosity and norm-
adherence (and thus cooperation) is not monotone. This contrasts with a com-
monly held opinion in the literature.34 In biological contexts where preferences
for cooperation are passed on genetically, higher degrees of viscosity always
enhance the ﬁtness of cooperators and thus make cooperative outcomes more
likely. In a context where cooperation is sustained through social norms and
where preferences for cooperation are transmitted culturally this ceases to be
true. The reason is that in this context viscosity aﬀects preferences via two
channels: It aﬀects behaviour and thus norm-adherence but it also aﬀects the
strength of social norms. The strength of the social norm aﬀects again behaviour
and norm-adherence.
34Bowles and Gintis (1997), Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005),
Wilson and Sober (1994).
22To illustrate the results look at the following example:
Example I Consider the most simple case where norm strength depends lin-
early on norm-adherence, i.e. where w(s)=s. Assume that a =3 /4 and
d =1 /2. In this case a + d>1, i.e. for a w-type the loss of unilateral
cooperation is higher than the gain of unilateral defection. As can be seen
in Figure 3 for x<1/3 the norm is strict in equilibrium (w =1 )a n d
p =1is globally stable. For x ∈ [1/3,1/2] both monomorphic equilibria
are locally stable with strict norms in both cases. In the equilibrium p =0
norm-strength is linearly decreasing in x (w =1−x). For x ∈ (1/2,3/5]
norm strength is intermediate but only p =0is locally stable. The reason
is that for x<3/5 norm-adherers are unconditional cooperators even for
intermediate norm-strengths. Finally for x>3/5 norm-strength is inter-
mediate (w =2 /5) and the polymorphic equilibrium e p =1− 3
5x is globally
stable.






Fig. 3a: Locally stable equilibria





Strenght of the Norm in
Stable Equilibrium
Figure 3b: Norm Strength
T h ec a s ei nw h i c ha + d < 1 (where the material loss of unilateral cooper-
ation is smaller than the gain of unilateral defection) delivers qualitatively the
same result.35 Cooperation survives in very viscous society sustained by strict
norms in a monomorphic equilibrium and in very integrated societies sustained
by intermediate norms in a polymorphic equilibrium.
35The case a + d = 1 is described at the end of Appendix B.
23We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 7 If a + d<1,∆ → 0 and
(i) x<a−d
1−d the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1
(ii) x ∈ [a−d
1−d,min{1−d
a,1−w−1(d)}] the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = p1
(iii) x ∈ [1 − d
a,1 − w−1(d)] the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =0
(iv) x>max{1 − w−1(d), a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is




Note that for both cases a + d ≶ 1 the long-run equilibrium in fully in-
tegrated societies (where matching is random) is always polymorphic. This
contrasts with what is obtained by relying on standard direct or indirect evo-
lutionary mechanisms. Furthermore in all these polymorphic equilibria w-types
are conditional cooperators. This is a behavioural pattern that is found also in
many experimental studies on cooperation problems in western societies.36
We can sum up the results of this section as follows:
Summary With endogenous norm strength and for vanishingly low levels of in-
stitutional pressures cooperation always survives in the following two sce-
narios: In very viscous societies sustained by strict norms in monomorphic
equilibria and in very integrated societies sustained by intermediate norms
in polymorphic equilibria.
We have seen that with endogenous norm strengths the relation between
viscosity and cooperation is non-monotonic (in contrast to for example what is
obtained with direct evolutionary approaches). Exogenous institutional charac-
teristics which drive behaviour in a very straightforward and monotonic way as
long as preferences do not change can thus have interesting and non-monotonic
eﬀects when preferences are allowed to adjust through some selection dynam-
ics. This has as a consequence that outcomes that seem (for policy makers)
impossible to induce if preferences are assumed to be ﬁxed can be induced by
manipulating institutional characteristics if one carefully considers the evolution
of preferences. The possibility of manipulating institutional characteristics in
order to achieve a certain outcome is what motivates a welfare comparison of
the diﬀerent cases.
4.2 Welfare
Welfare analysis is quite problematic in our context because of two main prob-
lems: First preferences of individuals are not ﬁxed over time. This problem can
be tackled by comparing situations where preferences are stable, i.e. long-run
equilibria. Note though that if the population state is polymorphic, individual
36Fischbacher, G¨ achter and Fehr (2001) ﬁnd that roughly 50% of the participants in their
public goods experiment are conditional cooperators, 30% always free-ride and only very few
cooperate unconditionally. See also the references contained in their paper.
24preferences are not ﬁxed even in stable equilibria. What is ﬁxed though in these
equilibria is the distribution of preferences in the population. If one is willing
to regard multiple ”selves” as diﬀerent individuals, the ﬁrst problem can be
regarded as essentially the same as the typical aggregation problem arising in
welfare economics.
The second main problem with welfare analysis in our context is more severe
and relates to the treatment of psychological payoﬀs. Sticking to revealed pref-
erence theory psychological payoﬀs constitute nothing else but an enlargement
of the domain of preferences (in this way they are treated in this paper) and as
such they should be included in any measure of welfare. The problem is that no
assumption is (and maybe can be ?) made about the exact neural or psycho-
logical processes underlying these payoﬀs. In particular no point is made about
the relation of positive emotions stemming from norm-conformity to negative
feelings stemming from norm-violation. While this distinction is irrelevant for
optimal behaviour and thus does not impact the previous analysis, it is clear
that it has starkly diﬀering welfare implications. This fact forces us to rely on
material payoﬀs when making welfare comparisons. One possibility is to look
at pareto-optimality.
We have the following result:
Proposition 8 T h es t a b l ec u l t u r a le q u i l i b r i u mp =1is always pareto-optimal.
Furthermore p = b p as well as p = e p and p = p1 are pareto-optimal for some
parameter constellations. p =0is never pareto-optimal.
Proof. Appendix B
As it can be seen the pareto-criterion is not very discerning between equi-
libria. Another possibility then is to aggregate preference through some welfare
function. I choose a classical utiliarianist criterion. With this criterion welfare
in a polymorphic equilibrium depends only on the distribution of preferences.
Using average material payoﬀsi nl o n g - r u ne q u i l i b r i u ma sa ni n d i c a t o ro fw e l f a r e
we state the following proposition:
Proposition 9 (i) If a + d>1 average material payoﬀ is highest in any long-
run equilibrium where p∗ =1(independently of (∆,x)).
(ii) If a+d<1 average material payoﬀ is highest in a long-run equilibrium
p∗ = b p ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Appendix B
The intuition is simply that in the ﬁrst case where a+d>1 the gains from
unilateral defection (1 − a) are smaller than the opportunity costs of unilat-
eral cooperation (d). Consequently the state where everyone cooperates assures
highest average payoﬀs independently of the value of (∆,x). In the second case
where a + d<1 this relationship reverses. Average material payoﬀsa r em a x i -
mized in a polymorphic equilibrium with high integration and a non-vanishing
level of institutional transmission.
The optimal choices of (∆,x) for a policy-maker can also be guided by non-
welfarist criteria or by aspects that are out of the scope of the present paper:
25Obviously the degree of integration could constitute a policy goal per se. The
reason is that high degrees of viscosity can be associated with high social costs
as becomes clear if one reﬂects again about the introductory example of immi-
gration. Another possible non-welfarist criterium could be the strength of the
social norm. To the extent where strict social norms limit ﬂexibility and impair
the capacity of economic agents to adapt to varying environments, policy makers
might be interested in bounding the strength of social norms. In short welfare
analysis will depend very much on the particular context and ﬁnding suitable
welfare-criteria is not straightforward in our context. It should have become
clear though from the analysis that achieving a maximum level of adherence to
the pro-social norm is not equivalent to maximizing welfare. In designing insti-
tutions policy makers have to account for the eﬀect institutional characteristics
have on social norms prevailing in a society and on the evolution of preferences.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I propose and study a cultural selection mechanism for preference
traits. In particular I concentrate on social norms for cooperation and ask un-
der which conditions norm-adherers can survive when matched in cooperative
dilemmas with agents that do not adhere to these norms and thus do not co-
operate. The main question examined is how the institutions of a society and
in particular the degree of integration (as opposed to viscosity) impact norm
adherence in the long run.
To these ends I present a cultural transmission process, based on two facts: 1)
Agents adopt social norms from each other via processes of social learning. And
2) institutions aﬀect the cultural learning process. One particular consequence
of institutions is highlighted, namely the pattern of interaction they impose on
the agents or more precisely the degree of integration. I ﬁnd that strict norms for
cooperation, inducing high levels of internal punishment, need either population
viscosity or strong institutional pressures in order to survive. On the contrary
intermediate norms can survive even in completely integrated societies and with
vanishingly low levels of institutional pressures.
I endogenize the strength of the norm, assuming that it is positively corre-
lated with the (subjectively felt) level of norm-adherence in the society. The
results show that there are basically two scenarios under which cooperation can
survive: The ﬁrst scenario is that of a rigid society, displaying a high degree of
viscosity and very strict norms sustained by strong internal punishment. Coop-
eration in this scenario is achieved through rigid population structures (viscos-
ity) that in turn lead to strict norms. In this sense rigidity is self-reinforcing.
The second scenario is one of an integrated society with intermediate norms
sustained by lower internal punishment and displaying heterogeneity of types in
equilibrium. Here integration stabilizes a polymorphic equilibrium with norms
that are not as strict. In fact in fully integrated societies all stable equilibria
are polymorphic. Furthermore there is always (conditional) cooperation in the
long-run equilibrium. This contrasts with results obtained by relying on stan-
26dard direct or indirect evolutionary mechanisms but is in line with experimental
results.
Lastly my ﬁnding that population viscosity is not necessary for the evolu-
tionary stability of pro-social norms also contrasts with results from the bio-
logical literature obtained by relying on replicator dynamics. Endogenizing the
strength of social norms I ﬁnd that, contrary to what kinship models or models
of group selection suggest, it is not even clear that population viscosity locally
enhances cooperation. If social groups are not completely isolated viscosity can
be detrimental to cooperation. Given the recent revival of group-selection ideas
it important to see how the rationale of these models depend on the process of
cultural transmission assumed. With endogenous norm-strength viscosity and
cooperation are not linked in a monotone way.
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306 Appendix 0 (Conformist Transmission)
In this section I give an informal account of the eﬀect of a conformist bias in
horizontal transmission on the set of locally stable cultural equilibria.37 Assume




(1 − α)ptx + α(Πw
t − Π0
t)1+ if m=w




(1 − α)(1 − pt)x + α(Π0
t − Πw
t )1+ if m=0
0i f m = w (16)
Each individual weights the independent probability of adapting a norm with
the popularity that a norm enjoys in the individuals sample. The parameter
α now measures the relative importance of the conformist and the payoﬀ-bias.
Typically α should be larger than 1/2, because if not even extremely beneﬁcial
norms could never spread. The state equation with popularity weighting is given
by
·
p = p(1 − p)x[((1 − α)x(2p − 1) + α(Πw − Π0))(1 − px∆)+∆] (17)
The conformist bias can be nicely read from the ﬁrst term in brackets.If
p>1/2 ,i.e. if there is a majority of norm-adherers this term is positive and
- ceteris paribus - the share of norm-adherers will rise. If p<1/2t h i st e r mi s
negative and thus norm-adherence will c.p. fall.
Obviously a conformist bias can locally enhance the stability of any monomor-
phic equilibrium. It is also clear though that this does not mean that polymor-
phic equilibria should dissappear. Whether they will depends on the relative
strength of α and ∆ as well as on payoﬀs.
7 Appendix A (Exogenous Norm strength)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Proof. Assume a + d 6=1 . (The case a + d = 1 is treated below). There are
four zeros of (10): p∗ =0 ,p ∗ =1a n d
p∗
1/2 =
(1 − a − d)+∆(a(1 − x) − d)
2(∆x(1 − a − d))
∓
s
[(a + d − 1)αx − αx∆(a(1 − x) − d)]2
−4(α(a(1 − x) − d)+∆)(α∆x2(1 − a − d)
2(α∆x2(1 − a − d))
37To state a formal proposition is rather complicated, as now the results will depend also
qualitatively on the parameter α. Consequently many diﬀerent cases and parameter constel-
lations would have to be examined.
31The derivative of the state equation evaluated at the two monomorphic equi-
libria is given by
f0(p)|p=0 = x(∆ + α((1 − x)a − d)
f0(p)|p=1 = −x[∆ + α(1 − ∆x)((a − d) − x(1 − d))]




a(1 − x) − d
(1 − a − d)x
=: p0
whereas the other zero diverges (lim∆→0 p2/1 = ∞)
F u r t h e r m o r ew eh a v et h a tf∆(p) as given by (10) converges uniformly to
f(p)=p(1 − p)xα(Πw − Π0)a s∆ → 0.38 This can be seen by noting that
|f∆(p) − f(p)|












∆(p)|p1/2 = f0(p)|lim∆→0 p1/2=p0
= −α
[(a − d) − xa][x(1 − d) − (a − d)]
1 − d − a
Then it is easy to see that p∗ = 0 is locally stable iﬀ
0 < ∆ <α [d − (1 − x)a]: =∆2 (18)
For ∆ → 0 this condition reduces to x>1 − d/a.
p∗ = 1 is locally stable iﬀ
((a − d) − x(1 − d) > 0) ∨ (∆ >
α(x(1 − d) − (a − d))
1 − αx((a − d) − x(1 − d))
=: ∆1) (19)
Again for ∆ → 0 this condition reduces to x<(a − d)/(1 − d).
And (for ∆ → 0)p = p1/2 is locally stable iﬀ
−α
[(a − d) − xa][x(1 − d) − (a − d)]
1 − d − a
< 0 (20)
38Actually as f∆(p) is a sequence of bounded functions mapping [0,1] into R and f(p)
is bounded and also maps [0,1] into R uniform convergence is equivalent to convergence in
metric space (F[0,1],d)w h e r eF[0,1] is the set of bounded functions from [0,1] → R and d is
the supremum metric.
32Consider the four cases of Proposition 1 in turn:
(i) In this parameter range f0(p)|p=0 > 0a n df0(p)|p=1 < 0, so we have that
p∗ = 0 is unstable and p∗ = 1 is locally stable. Continuity of f(p) implies that
the number of regular interior equilibria has to be even. As α(Πw − Π0)(1 −
ptx∆)+∆ =: Φ(p,∆) is a quadratic polynomial in p for any given ∆ there are at
most two regular interior equilibria. Two constellations of the payoﬀ parameters
have to be distinguished: If a+d<1w eh a v et h a t p2 > 1.a+d>1 ⇒ p1 < 0.
As there can neither be exactly two nor exactly one interior solution, there has
to be none.
(ii) For the second part observe that in this parameter range f0(p)|p=0 >
0 ∀∆ ∈ [0,1] while f0(p)|p=1 < 0i ﬀ∆≥ ∆1. For ∆ arbitrarily small both
monomorphic equilibria are thus unstable. a + d<1 ⇒ p1 ∈ (0,1) while p2
diverges. Note that the number of interior equilibria has to be odd. f0(p)|p=p0 <
0 is implied by a + d<1( ⇔ (a − d)/(1 − d) < 1 − d/a).
(iii) Observe that in this parameter range f0(p)|p=1 < 0w h e r e a sf0(p)|p=0 <
0i ﬀ∆≤ ∆2. For ∆ → 0,p ∗ =1a n dp∗ = 0 are stable. The interior equilibrium
p2 is unstable (as a + d>1) and separates the basins of attraction of the two
locally stable equilibria.
(iv) In this region f0(p)|p=1 < 0 whenever ∆ ≥ ∆2, while f0(p)|p=0 < 0i ﬀ
∆ ≤ ∆1. For arbitrarily small ∆ it is clear that only p = 0 is stable. f0(p)|p=p0 >
0 implies that interior equilibria are unstable.
Statement of result Case a + d = 1 :
With this parameter constellations cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 do not
arise. It follows from straightforward calculation that whenever x<1 − d
a(=
a−d
1−d) the unique stable equilibrium is p∗ = 1 and whenever x>1− d
a the unique
stable equilibrium is given by
p∗ =
½
1i f ∆ > ∆1
0i f ∆ < ∆1
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 a :
Proof. ”If”: It follows from (19) that ∆ > ∆1 is suﬃcient for local stability
of p =1 . ∆ ∈ [∆2,∆1] implies that both monomorphic states are unstable.
Exactly one regular interior zero thus exists. We know that if a + d<1t h i s
polymorphic equilibrium is locally stable.
”Only if”: We know from (19) that local stability of p = 1 implies either
x<a−d
1−d or ∆ > ∆1. But note that x<a−d
1−d implies ∆1 < 0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 b :
Proof. ”If”: It follows from (19) that ∆ > ∆2 > ∆1 is suﬃcient for local
stability of p =1 . ∆ ∈ [∆1,∆2] implies that both monomorphic states are
locally stable.
”Only if”: We know from (18) and (19) that global stability of p =1i s
suﬃcient for x<1 − d
a < a−d
1−d. But note that x<1 − d
a implies ∆2 < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Proof. First note that (Y,X,p) is a Nash-equilibrium iﬀ πw
t (X,z∗) ≥ πw
t (Y,z∗)

















it can be easily seen that πw
t (X,z∗) ≥ πw
t (Y,z∗)
⇔ [1 − (1 − p)x]a ≥ [1 − (1 − p)x](1 − w)+( 1− p)x(d − w)
⇔ p ≥
(1 − w − a) − x(1 − d − a)
x(a + d − 1)
=: e p ≤ 1
e p>0i ﬀ x>a+w−1
a+d−1 ∈ [0,1]. Note also that if p<e p the unique Nash-
equilibrium of the population game is (Y,Y,p).




p(1 − p)x∆ if p<e p
p(1 − p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − px∆)+∆]i f p ≥ e p
In the case of arbitrarily small ∆ there are two zeros of this dynamics: p∗ =0
and p∗ =1 . Note that lim∆→0 p2 = p0 < e p and lim∆→0 p1 = ∞.





(1 − 2p)x∆ if p<e p
(1 − 2p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − px∆)+∆]
+p(1 − p)x(−x∆α(Πw − Π0)) if p ≥ e p
Note that p = 0 is unstable whenever e p>0a n dx>0a si nt h i sc a s e
f0(p)|p=0 = x∆ > 0
Furthermore we know that p = 1 is locally stable iﬀ







∧ ∆ > ∆1]
Remember that x ≤ a+w−1
a+d−1 ⇔ e p<0. I ft h i si st h ec a s ew - t y p e sa r eu n c o n -
ditional cooperators and the proof of case (i) and case (ii) can be read directly
from the Proof of Proposition 1.
Case (iii): x ∈ (a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d]. We have that
x>
a + w − 1
a + d − 1




⇒ f0(p)|p=1 < 0
Consequently p = 0 is unstable (
·
p>0 ∀p<e p )a n dp = 1 globally stable.
34Case (iv): x>max{a+w−1
a+d−1 , a−d
1−d} :W eh a v et h a t
x>
a + w − 1
a + d − 1




⇒ f0(p)|p=1 < 0
Consequently both p =0a n dp = 1 are unstable. As furthermore there is
no interior regular equilibrium, e p is stable with basin of attraction [0,1].
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4a n d5 :
Proof. First note that (Y,X,p) is a Nash-equilibrium iﬀ πw
t (X,z∗) ≥ πw
t (Y,z∗)
where z∗ =( Y,X)
⇔ [1 − (1 − p)x]a ≥ [1 − (1 − p)x](1 − w)+( 1− p)x(d − w)
⇔ p ≤
(1 − w − a) − x(1 − d − a)
x(a + d − 1)
=: e p ≤ 1







[1 − (1 − p)x]σw
Xa =[ 1 − (1 − p)x][σw
X(1 − w)+( 1− σw
X)(d − w)]




[1 − (1 − p)x](1 − a − d)
Exspected material payoﬀso faw - t y p ea r et h u sg i v e nb y
Πw =
(
[1 − (1 − pt)x]a if pt ≤ e p
ad−w(1−w)−(1−p)(ad−(1−d)w)x
(a+d−1)(1−(1−p)x) if pt > e p (21)
The exspected material payoﬀ of a 0-type is
Π0 =
(
ptx +( 1− ptx)d if pt ≤ e p
d +
(1−d)(w−d)px
(1−a−d)(1−(1−p)x) if pt > e p (22)
Remember the population dynamics
f∆(p)=p(1 − p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − px∆)+∆] (23)
where the payoﬀs are given by (21) - (22). We have
f0




α(w − d)x(1 − d − w − x(1 − d))
1 − a − d
Then p = 0 is locally stable iﬀ
0 < ∆ <α (d − (1 − x)a)=∆1
35and p = 1 is locally stable iﬀ
x<
1 − d − w
1 − d
Inserting the payoﬀ-diﬀerence into (23) it can be easily seen that in the limit
where ∆ → 0 no interior regular equilibrium exists for the region where p ≥ e p.
In the region where p<e p the unique regular interior equilibrium is given by
p1. Remember that lim∆→0 p1 = p0 < e p,lim∆→0 p2 = ∞ and that p0 > 0
is equivalent to x<1 − d
a in this parameter region. Furthermore given that
x<1 − d
a stability of p = p1 requires
f0(p)|p=p1 = −α
[(a − d) − xa][x(1 − d) − (a − d)]









1−d∀w ∈ [d,1 − a] it can be easily
seen that in
Case (i) p = 0 is unstable just as p = p1 and thus p = 1 is globally stable
Case (ii) p =0a n dp = 1 are locally stable and p1 < 0
Case (iii) p =0a n dp = 1 are unstable and thus p = p1 globally stable
Case (iv) p = 1 is unstable, p1 < 0 and thus p = 0 globally stable.
8 Appendix B (Endogenous Norm-strength)
In order to state the proof for Proposition 6 ﬁrst note that p =0⇒ s =1− x
and p =1⇒ s =1 .D e n o t e
(1 − w(s) − a) − x(1 − d − a)
x(a + d − 1)
=: Γ(p)
and e p the solution to Γ(p)=p with corresponding norm strength w(e s).The
following Lemma shows existence of such a solution:
Lemma 1 There exists b x ∈ [0,1] s.th. if x ≥ b x there is a unique ﬁxed point e p
(solving Γ(p)=p) with corresponding norm-strength w(e s) ∈ [1 − a,d].
Proof. F i r s tn o t et h a ta sw(s) ∈ C2,w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 there exists e s s.th.
w(e s) ∈ [1 − a,d]. Assume that
x ≥
a + w(e s) − 1
a + d − 1
=: b x ∈ [0,1] (24)







36Obviously Ψ(p)i sac o n t i n o u sf u n c t i o no fp. Under condition (24) we have that

























(a + d − 1)
− 1 < 0
i.e. that Ψ(p) is strictly decreasing.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Proof. From Propositions 1 and 3 it follows that given a + d>1t h ei n t e r i o r
zero p2 will always be unstable independently of the strength of the norm. Note
also that a + d>1 ⇔ 1 − d/a < (a − d)/(1 − d).
Next examine the stability of the three candidates p =0 ,p =1a n dp = e p :
Focus ﬁrst on the case where p =0 . Then we have that if x>1−w−1(1−a)
Aw corresponds to a Prisoner’s dilemma payoﬀ-matrix and consequently p =0
is unstable. If x ∈ [1−w−1(d),1−w−1(1−a)] Aw represents a stag-hunt game.
In this case p = 0 is stable iﬀ x ∈ [1 − d
a,
a+w(e s)−1
a+d−1 ]. Finally if x<1 − w−1(d)
cooperation is a dominant strategy in game (2). Remember that in this case p =
0 is locally stable iﬀ x>1− d
a. Noting that
a+w(e s)−1
a+d−1 > 0i ﬀ x<1−w−1(1−a)
we can summarize that p∗ = 0 is locally stable iﬀ




a + w(e s) − 1
a + d − 1
] ∧ ∆ < ∆1 (25)
On the other hand p = 1 implies w = w(1) = 1 > max{1 − a,d}.T h e ni ti s














a+d−1 < 1 ⇔ x>1−w−1(d)w eh a v ef o r∆ → 0t h a t
e p is locally stable iﬀ
x>
a + w(e s) − 1
a + d − 1
(27)
Comparing conditions (25), (26) and (27) it can be seen that in
Case (i): p =0a n de p are unstable and p = 1 is globally stable
Case (ii): both monomorphic equilibria are locally stable while e p is unstable
Case (iii): p =1a n dp = e p are unstable and thus p = 0 globally stable
Case (iv): p = 0 is unstable while the other candidates are locally stable
Case (v): the monomorphic equilibria are unstable and e p globally stable.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
Proof. Observe ﬁr s tt h a t( a − d)/(1 − d) < 1 − d
a in this parameter region.
Consider the equilibrium p = 0 : In this case whenever x>1 − w−1(d) Aw
corresponds to a Prisoner’s dilemma payoﬀ-matrix and consequently p =0i s
37unstable. If x ∈ [1 − w−1(1 − a),1 − w−1(d)] Aw represents a chicken game. In
this case p = 0 is stable iﬀ x>1− d
a. Finally if x<1−w−1(1−a)c o o p e r a t i o n
is a dominant strategy in game (2). Remember that in this case p = 0 is locally
stable iﬀ x>1 − d
a.Summarizing thus p∗ = 0 is locally stable iﬀ
∆ < ∆1 ∧ x ∈ [1 −
d
a
,1 − w−1(d)] (28)









∧ ∆ > ∆2
¾
(29)
Observe then that in
Case (i): p = 1 is globally stable (independently of norm strength)
Case (ii): p =1a n dp = 0 are unstable and ∀p ∈ [0,1] the norm is either
strict or intermediate. Consequently p = p1 is globally stable (Proposition 1)
Case (iii): p = 0 is globally stable (as 1 − w−1(d) >x>1 − d
a > a−d
1−d).
Case (iv): If p = 0 the norm is weak and consequently p = 0 is unstable,
just as p =1( a sx>a−d





p>0.The globally stable equilibrium is thus the polymorphic
s t a t ew h e r et h en o r ms w i t c h e sf r o mb e i n gw e a kt ob e i n gi n t e r m e d i a t e .T h i si s
the state where w(s)=d or equivalently where p =1−
1−w−1(d)
x =: b p.
Statement of result Case a + d = 1
For this parameter constellation only two situations can arise: Whenever
w<1 − a defection is a dominant strategy for both types. Whereas whenever
w>1 − a defection is a dominant strategy for a 0-type and cooperation for a
w-type.39 We have: If ∆ → 0a n d
(i) 0 <x<a−d
1−d(= 1 − d
a) the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1
(ii) x ∈ [a−d
1−d,1 − w−1(d)] the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =0
(iii) x>1 − w−1(d) the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ =1−
1−w−1(1−a)
x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
Proof. Simply look at the exspected material payoﬀs any non-zero measure
of agents receives in each of the locally (or globally) stable equilibria: In the
equilibrium p =0w eh a v et h a tΠ0
|p=0 = d. While at p =1w eh a v eΠw
|p=1 = a.
At p = e p, Πw
|e p =( 1− (1 − e p)x)a<a= Πw
|p=1and Π0







1−d ∈ [1 − a,d]
At p = b p, Πw






|b p = pxσw∗
X + ((1 − px)+px(1 − σw∗
X ))d.
Note that Π0
b p >a⇔ w(s) ≥
a(1−x(1−p)−a2(1−(1−p)x)−(1−d)d(1−x)
(1−d)px ∈ [d,1−a].
39If w =1− a = d the bilateral game represented by Aw is trivial as all payoﬀs( m a t r i x -
entries) are equal.
38At p = p1,Πw
|p1 =( 1− (1 − p1)x)a<Πw
|b p <aand Π0
|p1 = p1x +( 1− p1x)d.
The latter expression is larger than Π0
b p for high enough ∆ and some w(s).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
Proof. (i) Consider ﬁrst the case where a+d>1 : Note that in this case all w-
types cooperate in the polymorphic equilibrium where p = e p. Average material
payoﬀ is thus given by







(a + d − 1)x
) ∈ (0,1)
minimizes ¯ Π(p). In addition a = ¯ Π(1) > ¯ Π(0) = d. Consequently ¯ Π(p)i s
maximized for p =1 .
(ii) In the case where a + d<1 average material payoﬀ in any polymorphic
equilibrium is given by
¯ Π(p)=p{(σw∗
X )2(1 − (1 − p)x)a +( 1− σw∗
X )(σw∗
X (1 − (1 − p)x)(1 − d)+d)}
+(1 − p){pxσw∗
X +( ( 1− px)+px(1 − σw∗
X ))d}
= d +
b p(w − d)(1 − d − w)
(1 − a − d)(1 − (1 − p)x)
This payoﬀ is larger than a = ¯ Π(1) whenever
b p>
(a−d)(1−a−d)(1−x)
w(1−w)−(1−a)ax−d(1−d−x(1−d)) ∈ (0,1)∀w ∈ [d,1 − a).
39